LINKING TOPICS IN TREATIES
STEVE CHARNoVITz*
1.

INTRODUCTION

How broad should a treaty be? This question has taken on
greater importance as governments and civil society have recognized the growing interdependence of nations. The logical response to interdependence is to increase cooperation among governments when necessary or useful. But given the broad array of
topics on which agreements may be appropriate, policy actors
need to decide how to group or package such topics. Are two
parallel negotiations on topics "A" and "B" better than one combined A and B negotiation? Although this question has been
looked at through the disciplines of economics, political science,
and international law, at this time, no adequate criteria exist on
how to choose between separating or combining A and B. This
Article offers a framework for thinking about this question.
Although the issue of policy linkage is an old one, the socalled "trade and" debates of the 1990s have refocused attention
on these issues. For example, how should the international trade
regime be linked, if at all, to the international environment regime? Should trade negotiations also include talks on labor standards? How should the World Trade Organization ("WTO") and
the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") work
together?
Governments, multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs"), and academics have offered answers to these questions, but often the answers seem internally inconsistent. For example, business groups have generally favored linking trade policy to intellectual property rights,
but have typically opposed linking trade and environmental policies.
This Article addresses these questions in the following way.
Section 2 highlights some policy linkages in the past involving the
trade regime. Section 3 discusses why policymakers might want
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to link differing issues. Section 4 discusses why policymakers
might want to avoid such linkage. Section 5 discusses linkage in a
different context: intergovernmental organizations with exclusive
memberships. Although not all instances of issue linkage need to
involve international trade, this Article primarily focuses on policy coordination that does involve trade.
2. POLICY LINKAGES IN THE PAST

Commentators considering "trade and" issues have sometimes
presumed a backdrop of a "pure" trade regime traditionally impervious to penetration by non-trade issues. Such a presumption
is inaccurate. The foundational agreements on international
trade-the bilateral Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation treaties of the 19th Century and early 20th Century-comprised an
amalgam of different
issues which foreshadowed the linkage issues
1
of the 1990s.
Consider the following examples:
Slave Trade: The Amity, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty
of 1825 between Great Britain and Argentina provided that Argentina would prohibit all persons subject
to its jurisdiction from
2
"taking any share" in the slave trade.
Religious Freedom: The Commerce and Navigation Treaty of
1894 between Great Britain and Japan provided that each country
would extend to subjects of the other country the "right of private or public exercise of their worship."3
Travel and Emigration: The Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation Treaty of 1874 between China and Peru recognized
"the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home"
and provided that citizens of each country could go freely to the

1 See U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION, RECIPROCITY AND COMMERCIAL
TREATIES 17 (1919) (noting that modem commercial treaties cover a wide variety of subjects such as immigration, police protection, travel, forced loans, military service, quarantine, and patents); WILLIAM SMrIH CULBERTSON, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIEs: A SURVEY OF THE ECONOMICS OF
DIPLOMACY 25 (1925) (noting that "the scope of international treaties is as wide
and diversified as are human activities and interests").
2 See Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 2, 1825, His Majesty-United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, art. XIX, 12 B.F.S.P. 29.
3 See Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, July 16, 1894, U.K.-Japan, art.
I, 180 Consol. T.S. 257, 259.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss2/6
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other "for the ?urposes of curiosity, trade, labour, or as permanent residents."
Labor Rights: The Commercial Agreement of 1921 between
the Czechoslovak Republic and Austria provided that each party,
by separate agreement, would assure that workers from the other
country would enjoy equivalent treatment
5 with respect to the
insurance.
social
and
workers
of
protection
Environment: The Commerce and Navigation Treaty of 1924
between Italy and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes
provided that in granting concessions for industrial plants, power
plants or defense work in the frontier zone, "every possible care
must be taken to avoid damage to neighbouring fishing rights and
the destruction of fish." 6 The Free Trade and Economic Integration treaty between Guatemala and Honduras of 1956 directed
both governments to "co-ordinate their activities with a view to
protecting forest reserves and water resources and preventing forest fires and7 soil erosion in the frontier regions of their respective
territories."
Narcotics: The Commercial Relations Treaty of 1903 between China and the United States committed China to adopt
measures to prevent the manufacture, within China, of morphine
and of instruments for its injection.
Intellectual Property: The Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty of 1925 between France and Siam provided that
Siam would ratify the Paris (industrial property), Madrid
(trademarks), and Berne (artistic works) conventions on intellec9
tual property and bring its law into conformity with them.

4 See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, June 26, 1874,
China-Peru, art. VI, 66 B.F.S.P. 1125.
5 See Commercial Agreement, May 4, 1921, Czech Rep.-Aus.,
art. 22, 15

L.N.T.S. 87.
6 See Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, July 14, 1924, Kingdom of Italy-Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Annex E, art. 22, 82 L.N.T.S.
259.
7 See Treaty of Free Trade and Economic Integration, Aug. 22, 1956, Guat.Hon., art. XIX, 263 U.N.T.S. 66.
s See Treaty as to Commercial Relations, Oct. 8, 1903, China-U.S., art.
XVI, 156, 1Malloy 261.
9 See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 14, 1925, Fr.Siam, art. 24, 43 L.N.T.S. 191.
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These examples show the broad range of what was relevant to
trade and friendship among countries. The fact that treaties
linked "friendship" and "commerce" is itself notable because a
trade economist might say that because commerce is mutually
beneficial among countries that are not friends, there is no reason
to link friendship to trade. It is true, as Ernst Haas has noted,
that the simultaneous presence of several issues does not necessar10
ily mean that "these issues are somehow linked to each other."
But when these issues appear in the same treaty, they might carry
a higher presumption of linkage.
From its inception, the international trade regime has included goals besides trade liberalization. The first multilateral
trade treaty, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") of 1947, contained provisions related to economic development.1 For example, the GATT permits developing countries to take protective or other trade measures affecting imports
in order "to implement programmes and policies of economic development designed to raise the general standard of living of their
people." 12 The GATT also states that trade negotiations shall take
into account the "fiscal, developmental,
strategic, and other
13
needs" of the participating countries.
The GATT, as amended in 1965, included additional provisions regarding economic development. For example, member
governments directed the GATT to "seek appropriate collaboration in matters of trade and development policy with the United
Nations and its organs and agencies ... "' It was also directed to
"collaborate in seeking feasible methods to expand trade for the
purpose of economic development, through international harmonization and adjustment of national policies and regulations ... . 15 The GATT, however, has not promoted much collaboration along these lines. 16 On the few occasions when
Ernst B. Haas, Why Collaborate?Issue-Linkage andInternationalRegimes,
32 WORLD POL. 357, 363 (1980).
1 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XVIII,
55 U.N.T.S. 188 [hereinafter GATT].
10

12 Id.

art. XvI(2).
"3Id. art. XXVIII [bis].
14 Id. art. XXX-II(2)(b).

15 Id. art. XX=XVfII(2)(e).
16 See Frieder Roessler, Diverging Domestic Policies and Multilateral
Trade
Integration, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONZATION 47-49 agdish N. Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996) (reviewing unsuccessful attempts in the
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss2/6
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environmental issues, such as overfishing, did come before the
GATT, no effort was made to integrate environmental and trade
concerns. 17
The Charter of the International Trade Organization of 1948
also contained goals besides trade liberalization.18 There were
provisions related to full employment, fair labor standards, double taxation, cooperation with the International Monetary Fund,
restrictive business practices, and intergovernmental commodity
agreements.' 9 Indeed, its breadth probably
contributed to the
20
failure of the Charter being put into force.
Perhaps the high-water mark of policy coordination was
2
Agenda 21, approved by nations in 1992 in a non-binding form. '
In Agenda 21, everything links to everything else. Regarding
trade and environment, the agreement urges countries to "[h]alt
and reverse protectionism" and to "[e]nsure that environment and
trade policies are mutually supportive, with a view to achieving
sustainable development."
Efforts within the WTO to ensure
that environment and trade policies are mutually supportive,
however, have foundered.2
In summary, the use of trade agreements as a vehicle to agree
upon non-trade issues is an old phenomenon. This practice was
probably reflective of a view of trade as being one of many issues
of international concern. As relationships between governments
24
deepen, more specific treaties supplement more general ones.
The reason why some of these non-trade provisions may seem
startling to contemporary analysts is that there is now greater
GATT to link trade and other policies); see also KENNETH W. DAM, THE
GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIc ORGANIZATION 387 (1970)
(noting that "[c]oordination of national policies has seldom been an interest of
the GATT").
17 See Problems of Trade in Certain Natural Resource Products,
GATT
B.I.S.D. (32d Supp.) at 126, paras. 6, 7, 41; see also Forestry Products, id. at 136.
'S See Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, Can. T.S.
1948:32 (not in force).
19 See id. arts. 3, 7, 11(2)(a)(ii), 24, 47-54, 55-70.
20 See generally William Diebold, Reflections on the InternationalTrade Organization, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 335 (1994).
21 See EARTH SUMMIT AGENDA 21 (United Nations, 1992).
Id. para. 2.10.
23 See generally Steve Charnovitz, A CriticalGuide to the WTO's Report on
Tradeand Environment, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 341 (1997).
24 See GEORGE MYGATr FISK & PAUL SKEELS PEIRCE, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL POLICIES 168 (1923).
2
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functionalism in international relations than there was forty or
140 years ago. Bureaucratic turf only begins to weigh heavily
once institutions are created.
3.

REASONS FOR LINKAGE

In thinking about why governments would link different policy issues, it may be helpful to start with a prior question of why
governments cooperate on a particular issue. 25 To analyze intergovernmental cooperation, distinguishing two types of such cooperation may be helpful.26 Essential cooperation occurs when
joint action is absolutely necessary to achieve the intended goal.
For example, preserving the ozone layer requires the joint action
of numerous users of ozone-depleting substances. By contrast,
mutually-reinforcing cooperation occurs when countries find that,
due to political considerations, joint steps increase the national
will to act. For example, every nation can liberalize trade unilaterally. Yet, they typically find that acting in concert makes it easier to legislate trade liberalization. Another example of such cooperation is the recent agreement on regulating corporate bribery
in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. This cooperation addresses competitiveness concerns by
providing a level playing field among corporations regulated by
different governments. Other examples involve international cooperation in banking, securities, and antitrust regulation.
One school of thought in international economics today is
that there is a limited scope for intergovernmental cooperation.
Analysts who adhere to this view are usually thinking only of essential cooperation. But once we also look at potential reliance
upon mutually reinforcing cooperation, the scope for such cooperation expands.
Another way of looking at the issue of cooperation is to consider the categories of market failure and government failure. Intergovernmental cooperation may be needed to address a transborder market failure. For example, imagine that there is a river
separating Countries X and Y and that manufacturing plants in
both countries dump toxic wastes in the river. Although this is a
25 See, e.g., ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE ET AL., A VISION FOR THE WORLD
ECONOMY 44-58 (1996) (discussing when international cooperation is desir-

able2 See Steve Charnovitz, Improving Environmentaland Trade Governance,7
INT'L ENVTL. AFF. 59, 63 (1995).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss2/6
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market failure, neither country would act alone to regulate the
pollution because solitary action would be ineffective. If the
countries agree to coordinate their environmental policies, however, such joint action can address the market failure.
Imagine that the pollution has been cleaned up and riverboat
companies start on both sides. For various reasons, Governments
X and Y are persuaded to subsidize the riverboats. The two companies operate at a loss, but can continue due to the government
subsidy. This looks like a government failure; it is not a market
failure. Now suppose that a new party comes into power and the
Government of X considers abandoning the subsidy. This would
make good economic sense, since X would save the tax dollars and
its citizens could still cruise on Y's boats. But X doesn't repeal the
subsidy because of domestic political opposition-for example,
from the boat workers or from investors in X's riverboat company. The opponents claim that it would be unfair for X's riverboat company to compete with Y's subsidized riverboat company. This sort of policy irrationality can continue in both
countries for a long time. Now suppose that the X and Y governments get together and agree that they will both eliminate the
subsidies. This would be an example of how mutually reinforcing
cooperation can address government failure.
These hypotheticals show that when both market and government failures are considered, there is potentially a great deal of
beneficial policy cooperation that governments can do. Although
the scope for such cooperation is not limitless, it seems likely that
the scope continues to grow. Having noted this trend, we can return to the main topic of the paper which is whether governments should link their cooperation on distinct issues.
There are four main reasons why governments might want to
link issues. They are: first, to enhance policy effectiveness; second, to rebalance policies; third, to build coalitions; and fourth, to
gain economies of scale.
3.1.

EnbancingPolicy Effectiveness

Enhancing policy effectiveness is the strongest reason for linkage.27 Economist John Bell Condliffe put it well when he wrote:
27 See James K. Sebenius, Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting
Issues andParties,37 INT'L ORG. 281, 296, 298 (1983) (discussing synergy among

issues). For a discussion of function-specific diplomacy, see also Michael P.

Ryan, The Function-Specific and Linkage Diplomacy of InternationalIntellectual
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"It is inconceivable that international economic problems can be
effectively handled unless their various aspects-migration, labor,
production, trade, finance, investment, and money-are considered in relation to one another."28 The link between intellectual
property and trade is a good example of how both policies can be
enhanced. By insisting that intellectual property be protected
worldwide, the WTO can facilitates trade since border checks for
patent and trademark violations may not be needed. Similarly, by
liberalizing trade, the WTO facilitates innovation since potential
markets are increased. The link between trade and competition
policy is another opportunity for two policies to enhance each
other.2 9 For example, the WTO Agreement on Telecommunications provides that governments will take action to prevent firms
from engaging in anti-competitive cross-subsidization. 30 The
linkage can also occur in the opposite direction. That is, other international organizations, besides the WTO, can seek to improve
trade policy. The best example is the policy intervention by the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. According to
Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence Summers, such efforts "have led to more systematic trade liberalization than
3 1 our bilateral or multilateral negotiations have ever achieved."
Trade liberalization and environmental protection can also be
fruitfully linked. 32 Greater trade liberalization can increase prosProper'y, in Symposium, Linkage as Phenomenon: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 201 (1998).
28 See JOHN BELL CONDLIFFE, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF WORLD
TRADE 386 (1940). Condliffe continues the discussion by stating the following:
This does not, indeed, mean that a single institution can deal effectively with such a wide range of problems on the international, any
more than on the national, plane, but it does imply the necessity of
close liaison between such institutions as may be handling various aspects of a related problem.

Id.
29 See generally Daniel J. Gifford & Matsuo MatsushitaAntitrustor Competition Laws Viewed in a Trading Context: Harmony or Dissonance, in 2 FAIR
TRADE AND HARMONIzATION, supra note 16, at 269-309.
30 WTO Agreement on Telecommunications Services, para. 1.1, 36 I.L.M.
354, 367 (1997).
1 Lawrence Summers, Why America Needs the IMF,WALL ST. J., Mar. 27,
1998, at A14.
32 See, e.g., DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT (1994); PETER
UIMONEN & JOHN WHALLEY, ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN THE NEW WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM (1997). See also Renato Ruggiero, A Shared Responsibility:
Global Policy Coherence for our Global Age, Address to the Colference on
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perity, which can enable more environmental protection. Similarly, better environmental safeguards can enable faster economic
growth and can prevent disputes between countries about environmental spillovers. Some commentators have denied that the
two goals of trade liberalization and environmental protection
can be pursued in harmony. For example, Frieder Roessler characterizes as "illusion" the idea that "the goals of trade liberalization and environmental protection can be obtained simultaneously in a single negotiation."33 Roessler comes to this conclusion
by viewing trade and environmental concessions as substitutes.
But this is too narrow a way to view the global economy. There
is no theoretical reason why Countries A and B cannot both be
better off if they agree to lower their trade barriers and to raise
their environmental standards. In other words, socially optimal
trade and environmental policies can be complements.
Trade measures are often utilized in treaties with non-trade
goals such as protection of health, maintaining fair competition,
34
protection of public morals, and protection of the environment.
Although some analysts may view this usage as exceptional, in reality, the linkage of trade measures to non-trade goals is common.
This seemingly paradoxical point can be understood when one
remembers that trade measures restrict trade. Parties to a treaty
may have many reasons to take joint action to restrict trade-for
example, to control narcotics supply. But pure trade motivations
to restrict trade (that is, to protect a domestic economy from foreign competition) are almost never going to be implemented via a
treaty. Governments that restrict trade for so-called trade reasons
for example, to reduce competitive imports, do so unilaterally
without a treaty. Thus, while trade agreements can be used to
pursue joint liberalization, such agreements deregulate trade
rather than employ trade measures as an instrument of policy. It
"Globalization as a Challenge for German Business" 5 (Dec. 9, 1997) (stating
that the WTO has every interest in building an effective bridge between the
multilateral trade agenda and the multilatera environmental agenda, not least
because without a coherent strategy for addressing these challenge, it is trade
liberalization that will suffer).
33 Frieder Roessler, Domestic Policy Objectives and the Multilateral Trade
Order, in THE WTO As AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 226 (Anne 0.
Krueger ed., 1998).
34 See generally Steve Charnovitz, Trade Measures and the Design of InternationalRegimes,5J. ENV'T. & DEV. 168 (1996) (discussing 30 cases inwhich trea-

ties employ trade measures).
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will be so-called non-trade treaties (e.g., narcotics) that will use
trade measures as an instrument of policy.
Perhaps the most significant episode of policy linkage during
the 1990s was the decision of the Uruguay Round trade negotiators to conclude sixteen major trade agreements as a single undertaking.35 This meant that countries could not decide to join the
WTO but, say, skip the agreement on intellectual property.
Thus, although it is the subject of many disagreements about the
appropriateness of trade linkage, the WTO itself is probably the
world's greatest institutional beneficiary of policy linkage because
it blends together so many disparate agreements.3 6 The linked
agreements of the WTO arose out of the long tradition in the
GATT for "rounds" of trade negotiations that considered an increasing array of issues.
Another innovation of the Uruguay Round was to establish a
dispute settlement system wherein a winning plaintiff could employ trade measures against a losing defendant that fails to correct
the WTO violation being complained about. 37 In other words,
the WTO allows trade measures to be used to enforce the various
obligations of the new agreements. Many commentators have
suggested that if trade measures for enforcement are appropriate
to achieve better compliance with WTO obligations, such measures could also be made available to achieve better compliance
with obligations under other treaties such as those concerning the
environment.
3.2.

OtherReasonsfor Linkage

A second reason for linkage is to rebalance policy spillovers
induced by the new treaty. For example, because of the potential
for greater trade to worsen environmental conditions, it could be
useful to formulate trade and environmental policies together.
Conversely, there is a potential for environmental agreements to
impede international trade. For example, the Basel Convention
35 See JEFFREYJ. SCHOrr, THE URUGUAY ROUND 133-34 (1994).
36 But it is interesting to note that the WTO dispute settlement agreement

seems to disfavor linkage m some respects. It states that "[i]t is also understood
that complaints and counter-complaints in regard to distinct matters should not
be linked." Understanding on Riles and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 3(10), 33 I.L.M. 1226.
37 See id art. 22. This provision contains rules for when the trade sanctions
can be employed against otler sectors other than that in dispute.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss2/6
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on hazardous wastes hampers trade in recyclables. That potential
provides another reason to link trade and environment policies.
A third reason for linkage is to build coalitions either domestically or internationally. 38 The linkage of the labor and environmental side agreements to the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA") was aimed primarily at boosting U.S.
public support for the NAFTA. This was not an instance of rebalancing because the side agreements contained no commitments
to address any adverse labor or environmental effects of trade liberalization.
The more common reason for linkage is to build international
coalitions. Two countries might not be able to agree on a singleissue negotiation because the issues will affect them differently.
Yet if more issues are added, agreements may be facilitated as
39
countries make concessions to gain what they value most highly.
For example, during the recent Uruguay Round, the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights was of
great interest to major industrial countries while the Agreement
on Textiles and Clothing was of great interest to developing countries. Close observers of the WIPO and the GATT/WTO have
suggested that the tighter disciplines for protecting patents, copyrights, and trademarks achieved during the Uruguay Round could
never have been negotiated within WIPO because that organization is so narrow. In other words, WIPO did not have the sufficient policy space to provide the necessary quid pro quo.
A fourth reason for linkage is to gain economies of scale.40

Rather than carry out two parallel negotiations, governments
might prefer to consolidate them to save time in assembling and

exchanging information. Sometimes even unrelated issues are tied
together out of expediency. A good example of this was the
38

See Bernard M. Hoekman, Determining the Need for Issue Linkages in

MultilateralTrade Negotiations,43 INT'L ORG. 693-96 (1989); Michael P. Ryan,
The Function-Specific and Linkage Diplomacy of InternationalIntellectual Property, in Symposium, Linkage as Phenomenon:An InterdisciplinaryApproach, 19
. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 201 (1998),
39 See Robert D. Tollison & Thomas D. Willett,An Economic Theory of
Mutually Advantageous Issue Linkages in InternationalNegotiations, 33 INT'L
ORG. 425, 437, 444 (1979); Haas, supra note 10, at 371-77; see also William J.
Aceves, InstitutionalistTheory and InternationalLegal Scholarship, 12 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 227, 248-49 (1997).
40 See David Vines, The WTO in Relation to the Fund and the Bank: Competencies, Agendas, and Linkages, in THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 33, at 62.
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Treaty of Peace (Versailles) which stated that a party ratifying it
would be deemed to be ratifying the Opium Convention of
1912.41 Another example was the Treaty of Peace (St. Germainen-Laye) in which Austria agreed to adhere to multilateral treaties
on white phosphorus matches and the unification of commercial
statistics.4 These linkage provisions are striking in that they effectively require governments to join an international treaty that
they might not want to join.
In summary, governments might want to link international
policies for four reasons: (1) to make one or both policies more
effective, (2) to offset spillovers resulting from a policy change, (3)
to build coalitions necessary to get either or both policies
adopted, and (4) to gain economies of scale. Separating these reasons in one's thinking can be helpful not only in deciding
whether to pursue linkage, but also in countering the arguments
of those opposing linkage. Economic analysis may be helpful in
deciding whether to link, but it cannot be dispositive. 43 Because
of bargainin dynamics, negotiating conditions may not be easily
predictable.
4. ARGUMENTS AGAINST LINKAGE
Several arguments are used against policy linkage. Critics often deny that policies are linked in a substantive way or should be
so linked. For example, the U.S. business community has denied
that trade and labor standards are connected. Linking issues that
should remain unlinked can become a precedent and encourage
groups to seek future linkage. This can lead to situations where a
covert linkage is made, but the parties deny publicly that a linkage
exists. An example of this is the linkage between arms trading
and the release of hostages.
41 Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, art. 295, 112 B.F.S.P. 1. See THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE FUTURE 129-30 (1944). The linkage more than

tripled the number of parties to the Opium Convention.
42 Treaty of Peace, Sept. 10, 1919, art. 240, 226 Consol. T.S. 8.

43 See JOHN STUART MILL, PRINcIPLES OF PoLmcAL ECONOMY at xxvii
(William Ashley ed., 1909) (pointing out that except on matters of mere detail,
there are perhaps no practical questions, even among those which approach
nearest to the character of purely economic questions, which admit of being
decided on economic premises alone).
44

See Howard F. Chang, Carrots,Sticks, and InternationalExternalities, 17

INT'LREV. L. & ECON. 309 (1997).
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Linkage may also be opposed if it would change the outcome
of negotiations to a result opposed by the critic. For example,
Llewellyn H. Rockwell is worried about the Clinton Administration's proposal for fast track because he believes that "if the Clinton Administration had its way, the entire charter of the International Labour Organization would be imposed on the Third
World, dramatically raising labor costs and crippling opportunities for expanded investment."45 Frieder Roessler has warned that
the "hoped-for cross-fertilization [among trade and non-trade objectives] is likely to turn into cross-contamination." 46 Roessler
bases this prediction on a study of past linkages between the
GATT and monetary policy, development policy, and competition policy.
Another common argument against linkage is that it will slow
down negotiations. 47 For example in September 1997, a group of
economists made a public statement in favor of fast track authority saying:
We strongly support fast-track legislation in the traditional
form that does not link trade liberalization to requirements concerning labor and environmental standards. Insisting on such a linkage in view of the wide differences
among our trading partners on appropriate standards in
these areas will slow down or even possibly halt the opening
up of world markets through trade-liberalizing negotiations ....

Human rights and environmental issues clearly deserve attention, but we believe they should be pursued in a proactive manner in institutions other than those concerned
with the liberalization of trade ....More efficient outcomes are achieved by institutional specialization in policy
" Llewellyn H. Rockwell, No Loss for World Trade, J. COM., Nov. 14,
1997, at A7. Rockwell isthe president of the Ludwig von Mises Institute.
Roessler, supra note 33, at 228.
47 See William Wallace, Issue Linkage Among Atlantic Governments, 52
INT'L AFF. 163, 177 (1976) (explaining that it becomes far easier to reach con-

structive agreement upon specific issues if the parties involved accept a limitation upon the range of related questions to be brought into consideration).
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assignment coupled by consultation
and coordination
48
organizations.
relevant
the
among
Jeffrey L. Dunoff has also pointed49out the potential for new issues
to hamper progress on old issues.
A related argument against linkage is that international institutions may lack the capacity for it. There may be an inadequacy
of staff resources or expertise. Moreover, by blurring missions,
international agencies may lose their sense of direction. 0 The
economists' letter points to the benefits of functional institutional
specialization in policy assignment. The economists probably
mean that trade negotiations should be about trade, not about,
say, worker rights. But that begs the question of where to discuss
issues that intertwine the two-for example, the issue of export
processing zones that derogate from the labor rights typically accorded in the rest of the country.
The economists favor "consultation and coordination" among
intergovernmental organizations. One reason why there is pressure for "trade and" linkages is that the WTO remains resistant to
such coordination with the International Labour Organization
("ILO") or the U.N. Environment Programme. It is interesting
to note that the Charter of the International Trade Organization
of 1948 called on the Trade Organization to consult the ILO
when disputes arose about unfair labor conditions in production
for export. 5' Although the WTO has the authority to consult
with the ILO, 52 it has chosen not to do so.
In summary, several arguments are made against policy linkage: (1) there is no reason for linkage, (2) linkage would produce
Peter Passell, Loading the TradeAgenda with DiverseIssues Could Backfire,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 9, 1997, at D2; Letter from Bob Baldwin to Steve Charnovitz,
Director of the Global Environment & Trade Study at Yale University 1 (Oct.
6, 1997) (on file with author) (citing open letter) (emphasis added).
49 See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, "Trade andts Recent Developments in Trade Policy
and Schoanhip-And Their SurprisingPoliticalImplications, 17 J. INT'L L. Bus.
759, 766 (I197)
50 See David Palmeter, InternationalTrade Law in the Twenty.First Century,
18 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1653, 1656 (1995) (arguing against giving the WTO responsibility for environment, labor or antitrust issues).
51 See Havana Charter of the International Trade Organization, supra note
18, art. 7(3).
48

52

See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,

1994, art. V() 33 .L.M. 1144 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
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bad policy results, (3) linkage would slow down negotiations, and
(4) linkage would drain an agency's resources and confound its
mission. Negotiators considering linkage will need to weigh these
arguments against the purported benefits of a package.
5.

RESTRICTIVE MEMBERSHIP ORGANIZATIONS

No discussion of linkage would be complete without a brief
mention of restrictive-member intergovernmental organizations,
such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") and the European Union. Countries trying to
join these organizations must engage in accession negotiations in
which they can be asked to make domestic policy changes. For
example, Korea committed to labor law changes when it joined
the OECD in 1996. s5 Eastern European countries joining the
European Union have made significant changes in their environmental policies.
The WTO is also a restrictive membership organization. For
example, China has tried for over a decade to join, but has been
blackballed by governments (like the United States) that are try4
ing to link membership to domestic policy changes in China.5
One might perceive this exclusion as a failure to qualify for membership, rather than linkage per se. Yet the WTO does not have
any specific membership criteria.55 China is being asked to liberalize markets in ways that current WTO members-for example,
Cuba-are not being asked to do.
Such accession negotiations are, in fact, a practical application
of linkage. Membership is being used as a carrot to induce policy
changes. Although all international organizations restrict their
membership (if only to states), only some organizations require

policy changes as a price of membership. It is interesting to note
that in 1923, Ethiopia's application to join the League of Nations
was opposed by three European countries until Ethiopia agreed to
53 See Steve Charnovitz, Trade, Employment and Labour Standards:
The
OECD Study andRecent Developments in the Trade andLabor StandardsDebate,

11 TEMP. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 131, 153-54 (1997).
54 See, e.g., Tony Walker et al., China Vows to Defy US on GATT Entry
Terms, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1994, at 6; see also Daniel T. Griswold, China, Stop
Toying with the WTO, J. CoMM., Jan. 27, 1998, at 6A (taking the mercantilist

position that China must improve its offer on furniture, toys and beer before it
should be admitted to the WTO). Griswold is an analyst at the Cato Institute.
55 See WTO Agreement, supra note 52, art. XII.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa.J. Int'lEcon. L.

[Vol 19:2

suppress slave traffic.56 By contrast, the United Nations has taken
an inclusive approach to applying its membership requirement of
being a "peace-loving" state.
The creation of a regional trading block provides another context for linkage discussions. As Andre' Dua and Daniel Esty have
noted, the negotiations for greater Asia-Pacific economic cooperation seek to create a new community.5 Within a community,
demands for linkage may be harder to resist because community
mechanisms should reduce negotiation costs and because the costs
of unharmonized policy will become more apparent.
6. CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to present a framework for determining the scope of potential international agreements, particularly involving trade. The question is important because there are
political pressures to expand the WTO to include trade-related issues-like environment, labor, and antitrust policy. Such an expansion would build upon the Uruguay Round, which incorporated new trade-related issues like domestic subsidies, product
standards, food safety rules, and intellectual property rights.
Although the debate about the proper scope of trade treaty often presupposes the existence of an ideal form of a pure trade
agreement, this Article points out that there has been a long tradition of multiple-issue trade agreements. Indeed, even the GATT
is not single-minded about trade; it contains provisions relating to
economic development. Thus, broadening trade agreements to
include non-trade goals would not represent a sharp break from
the past.
Having shown that linking issues is not inherently inappropriate, the Article next considers when linkages should be made.
Four reasons for making a treaty linkage are put forward and illustrated: first, to enhance policy effectiveness; second, to rebalance spillovers; third, to build political coalitions; and fourth,
to gain economies of scale in negotiations. The first reason is the
strongest one. By negotiating two or more issues simultaneously,
governments might achieve more than by negotiating the two is56 See FREDERICK A. MIDDLEBUSH & CHESNEY HILL, ELEMENTs OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 326-27 (1940).
17 See U.N. CHARTER art. 4, para. 1.

58 ANDRt DUA & DANIEL C. ESTY, SUSTAINING THE ASIA PACIFIC
MjRAcLE 5, 109, 125-29 (1997).
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sues separately. For example, it might be better for governments
to reach agreement on trade and global commons protection at
the same time than to do the trade agreement first hoping that the
global commons agreement will be concluded later.
There may also be good arguments against linkage. Linking
issues in negotiations can slow down such talks, and thus delay
the benefits of earlier policy coordination. In addition, overloading new issues can impede the effectiveness of existing international institutions. These potential problems exist even when
each of the goals to be linked represents sound policy. Of course,
when a popular goal does not represent sound policy, skeptics
have another reason to oppose linkage.
The final section of the Article notes the connection between
the question of what issues should be considered by the WTO and
the question of who gets to join the WTO. Unlike the United
Nations which has universal membership, the WTO is a restricted membership organization. Several countries, such as
China, are being kept out until they agree to make changes in
their domestic policy. Thus, membership is being used as an instrument of linkage. The discussion of China is not meant to
suggest that if China becomes a WTO member, it would favor
WTO consideration of issues like environment or human rights.
More likely, China would become an opponent of expanding the
WTO's mandate.
Although much of the Article uses the example of the WTO,
the suggested framework for evaluating policy linkage should be
applicable to all international economic and social lawmaking. As
national economies grow and engender more troublesome transborder spillovers, there will be a greater need to deepen policy
harmonization among countries. Prior treaties may provide useful templates. Yet governments and civil society should constantly look for new ways to reorganize cooperation so as to enhance global welfare.
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